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deciding at what point official cooperation with the media would constitute
sufficient state involvement to bring the case within the Simmons rationale.
The Zeiler court wisely did not attempt to settle all questions about the
potential prejudicial effects of media publicity on eyewitnesses; but rather
settled only the outer limits of the applicability of the Simmons holding and
established, for this circuit, that a defendant cannot successfully challenge
the admissibility of allegedly biased eyewitness testimony without an affirmative showing that such testimony was the product of official participation
in the identification process.
T.A.H.

Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure
CIVIL PROCEDURE -

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) - SUPERIORITY REQUIREMENT - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE WHEREBY COMMISSIONER
OF LABOR MAY REPRESENT EMPLOYEES IN ACTION AGAINST EMPLOYER IS NOT A SUPERIOR METHOD OF ADJUDICATION.

Amalgamated Workers Union v. Hess Oil
Virgin Islands Corp. (3d Cir. 1973)
The Amalgamated Workers Union of the Virgin Islands (AWU)
and four of its members instituted a class action on behalf of all union
members who worked a rotating shift for Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation (Hess), alleging that Hess required employees to work the shift
without overtime compensation in violation of the Virgin Islands Fair
Labor Standards Act (VIFLSA).' Hess moved to dismiss the class action
contending that procedures available before the Commissioner of Labor
were "superior" to class enforcement, 2 and the United States District Court
for the Virgin Islands "remanded" the case to the Department of Labor. "
1. Amalgamated Workers Union v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 478 F.2d 540 (3d
Cir. 1973). Plaintiffs' claims arose under section 20(a) of the VIFLSA which
provides for overtime compensation of not less than 1% times the employee's
regular rate for work in excess of 5 consecutive days, or 40 hours in a work week,
or 8 hours in a workday. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 20(a) (1970). Liability of
the employer to the employee for violation of section 20 is defined as the full amount
of the wage rate less any amount paid, as well as court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees as allowed by the court. Id. § 17(a).
2. 478 F.2d at 542. Section 17(b) of the VIFLSA provides that the Commissioner of Labor may sue the employer on behalf of the employee and collect
and hold the judgment in trust for the employee, with costs and attorney's fees
recoverable from the employer. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 17(b) (1970).
In
addition, section 17(c) allows the Attorney General to bring an action to restrain
violations of fair labor standards. Id. § 17(c).
3. The appellate court noted that the use of the term "remand" by the lower
court was inappropriate since the case had not originated in the Department of
Labor. The Third Circuit interpreted the lower court's action as a dismissal of
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The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the statutory provisions allowing
employees to request the Commissioner of Labor to prosecute a suit in their
behalf did not provide an alternative superior to the class action method of
adjudication and that the lower court, therefore, had abused its discretion
in effecting dismissal under rule 23(b) (3). The court further held that
dismissal of the suit could not be predicated, alternatively, upon either the
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies or upon a reading
of the applicable statute which would require wage and hour litigation to
be prosecuted through the Commissioner. Amalgamated Workers Union v.
Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 478 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1973).
A class action brought pursuant to rule 23(b) (3) must satisfy two
requirements in addition to the prerequisites of subdivision (a) of the rules:
predominance of common questions of law or fact, and superiority of the
class action over other available methods of adjudication.4 Commentators 5
and the courts 6 have generally considered alternatives which may be
superior to the class action to be restricted to methods of handling the
matter within the courts, such as joinder, intervention, and consolidation.
The decision to permit litigants to proceed as a class is a discretionary one,
4. Rule 23(b) (3) provides that the court must find:
that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Factors (A) through (D) are pertinent as guides in assessing compliance
with rule 23(b) (3) but are not exhaustive. Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D.
98, 104 (1966). The requirements of predominance of common questions and
superiority are usually considered independently and equally. 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE
23.45[31, at 23-801 n.2 (2d ed. 1969). See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass
Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
5. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 391 n.135 (1967) ;
Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REV.
433, 442 (1959). But see, Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C.
INI. & CoM. L. REV. 539, 553 (1969) ; Comment, Developments in the Law of Federal
Class Action Litigation - Catch 22 in Rule 23, 10 HOUSTON L. REV. 337, 362

(1973).
6. Comment, Developments in the Law of Federal Class Action Litigation Catch 22 in Rule 23, supra note 5, at 362-63. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &

Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp.,
44 F.R.D. 559, 572 (D. Minn. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am.
Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968). But see Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D.
472, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
7. Where there is doubt as to whether the plaintiffs should be permitted to
proceed as a class, the question should be resolved initially in favor of allowing the
class action. Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 100 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 928 (1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/6
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committed to the trial court8 and, as such, will not be readily disturbed
on appeal.9
The opinion of the district court in the instant case was unclear. The
court of appeals noted that the dismissal could have been based upon three
different, independent theories:
(1) The Department of Labor has the expertise and personnel to
make a superior adjudication and thus must be preferred under the
requirements of F.R.C.P. 23(b) (3) ; or, (2) Application must be first
made to the Department of Labor and its administrative remedies
exhausted before court adjudication; or, (3) All wage litigation must
be channelled through the Department.'
The court considered the first possible theory a "misapplication of the
'superiority requirement' of Rule 23 (b) (3)."" Without deciding the issue,
the court stated that there was no apparent justification for weighing the
advantages of an administrative remedy in making the superiority determination. 12 Underlying the court's view was the conclusion that the intent
behind the superiority requirement was to compel consideration of the
method of adjudication in terms of the advantages of one judicial proceeding
in one forum over multiple proceedings in multiple forums.' 2 Consideration
of the advantages of an administrative remedy in the determination of
whether a class action should be maintained would necessitate weighing
the value of a remedy against the value of a form of action, and the court
was unable to find any suggestion in the rule or the Advisory Committee's
14
Notes that such a consideration would be appropriate.
The court concluded that even if the advantages of an administrative
remedy could properly be weighed against the value of a class suit, the
lower court had abused its discretion in its determination of the superiority
of such an alternative.' 5 The court noted that the role of the Commissioner
of Labor was to initiate suit on behalf of an employee only if so requested
8.

FED. R_

Civ. P. 23(c)(1).

9. City of N.Y. v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d

Cir. 1969); cf. Interpace Corp. v. City of Phila., 438 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1971).
10. 478 F.2d at 542.

11. Id. at 543.
12. Id.
13. Id. The court found this intent to be evidenced by the language and structure
of rule 23 and the language of the Advisory Committee's Notes. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The Hess court ordered that, on remand, the lower court should give
consideration to maintenance of the action alternatively under subsections (b) (1)
and (b) (2) of rule 23, in addition to rule 23(b) (3). Id. at 544.
Consideration of such alternatives may be of special importance in light
of the recent Supreme Court decision in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 94 S. Ct.
505 (1973), wherein the Court held that each plaintiff in a class action brought
pursuant to rule 23(b) (3) must satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). It can not be ascertained from the opinion
in the instant case whether each member of the proposed class satisfied the
jurisdictional requirements applicable to the district courts of the Virgin Islands.
See V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 4, §§ 32, 73 (1967).
IfDigital
not Repository,
considered by the court
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by that employee. 16 The statute gave no authority to the Commissioner
to make preliminary findings, and contained no language regarding the
ability of the Wage Board or the Commissioner to provide any relief to
complainants.' 7 The court thus viewed the expertise of the Commissioner
as immaterial, since only the court, and not the Commissioner, could reach
an ultimate decision on the merits.' 8
In holding that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
was inapplicable because the agency was unable to grant the relief requested, 19 the court noted that application of that doctrine was independent
of the nature of the suit. If the facts of the case had made the doctrine
applicable, it would have been applied whether the suit had been pursued
20
by an individual or a class.
Further, the court considered that the exhaustion of administrative
remedies argument was, in effect, an argument that all claims under section
17 of the VIFLSA had to be pursued through the Commissioner. 21 The
court found, however, that the statutory provision authorizing the Commissioner to bring suit on behalf of employees 22 was intended as an alternative mode of action for employees, and had its foundation in the belief that
employees might fear recrimination from their employer, or would not
be in a position to afford legal fees to pursue the action oi their own. 23
In refusing to read the statutory language as providing a mandatory procedure, the court found "instructive comparisons" in two federal statutes
and related cases in which similar language had been held to be permissive
rather than mandatory. 24
Since the language of the rule and the Advisory Committee's Notes
emphasize the fair, efficient, and practical handling of each particular situ16. 478 F.2d at 543. See note 2 supra.
17. 478 F.2d at 543. See note 2 supra. The general powers and duties of the
Commissioner of Labor are defined in section 5 of the VIFLSA, V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 24, § 5 (1970), and those of the Wage Board in sections 7 and 8. Id. §§ 7, 8.
18. 478 F.2d at 543.
19. Id. at 544. The rule regarding the requirement of exhaustion of remedies
was stated in American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Resor, 442 F.2d 993 (3d Cir.
1971), as follows:
[Wihen Congress has provided an administrative procedure which is capable
of resolving a controversy such procedure must be utilized. It is only after
the final administrative decision that the aggrieved parties may invoke the
jurisdiction of the courts ....
Id. at 994. That court noted that an exception to the rule existed:
If the prescribed administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate
to prevent irreparable injury, or when there is a clear and unambiguous statutory
violation, then a court need not defer decision until the conclusion of the
administrative inquiry.
Id. at 994-95.
20. 478 F.2d at 544.
21. Id. at 544-45.
22. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 17(b) (1970). See note 2 supra.
23. 478 F.2d at 545.
24. Id. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970), construed in
DeFigueiredo v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1384, 1388 (S.D.N.Y.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/6
1971); Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 464(a) (1970), construed in
Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886, 923-24 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
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ation,2 5 it is arguable that consideration of any alternative method of
adjudication which might attain those goals is not precluded. The Hess
court did not consider available administrative relief as an alternative on
the basis that to do so would be to weigh remedy against method.2 6 However, that the court must exclude an alternative method of adjudication
from consideration merely because it is outside the formal judicial process
is questionable in view of the purpose of rule 23. To consider such an
alternative would not alter the question under 23(b)(3) of whether the
method available would be superior to class litigation.
The Hess court's characterization of the issues involved
resulted in a
conclusion that the administrative "remedies" are not to be considered
when judging the propriety of maintaining the class action.27 Yet, the
court also concluded that the statute involved was not intended to provide
a remedy.28 If the statute does not provide a remedy, then it seems a
possible conclusion that it provides an alternative method of proceeding
with the suit, an alternative arguably within the "other available methods"
language of rule 23 (b) (3).
While the Hess court did not hold that resort to an administrative
agency, even where that agency is able to grant relief, would be an improper consideration in determining the superiority of a class action, its
dicta concerning the impropriety of weighing administrative "relief" against
a class action in determining whether a suit satisfies the requirements of
rule 23(b) (3) may indicate that the Third Circuit might so hold in an
appropriate case.
P.D.M.

FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE CONDUCTED
STANTIVE

STATISTICAL ANALYSES
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DIRECT
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Bair v. American Motors Corp. (3d Cir. 1973)
Plaintiff brought an action for damages against defendant-manufacturer alleging that she had been injured in an automobile accident because
the defective design of the door latch failed to prevent her automobile
door from opening on impact.1 At trial plaintiff attempted to prove
25. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3); Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 98,
103 (1966).
26. 478 F.2d at 543. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
27. 478 F.2d at 543.
28. Id.
1. Bair v. American Motors Corp., 473 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1973).

Published
by Villanova
Widger
of Law Digital
Repository,
serious
physical University
injuries, Charles
according
to School
her medical
expert,
would 1973
not
sustained had she not been ejected from her vehicle. Id. at 741 n.l.

Plaintiff's
have been

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 6

330

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 19

through expert testimony that defendant's failure to incorporate a specific
latch design was negligent, and that the absence of such a latch made the
product inherently defective. 2 Three statistical analyses were offered as
the basis for, and in corroboration of, the expert's opinion.3 An objection
to the introduction of this evidence as hearsay 4 was sustained and the
court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the defendant. 5
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that under the "learned treatise"
exception to the hearsay rule, independent statistical analyses may be
introduced as evidence during direct examination to support an expert

witness' testimony. Bair v. American Motors Corp., 473 F.2d 740 (3d
Cir. 1973).
While a majority of courts view learned treatises as inadmissible as
substantive evidence of the statements asserted therein,7 some courts
have recognized a limited exception." Prior to Bair the Third Circuit
had taken the position that where an expert was unable to testify of his

own knowledge as to the nature of the source from which statistics
found in reports were gathered, the studies were inadmissible.9 It followed that the expert, lacking the necessary testimonial qualifications,
was not permitted to base his testimony on items contained in the study.1 0
2. Plaintiff contended that by failing to adopt a T-head type bolt assembly,
American Motors had neglected to incorporate the current state of the art in safe

design. Id. at 742.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965), imposes strict

liability on one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer. See, e.g., Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966),
noted in 12 VILL. L. REV. 204 (1966). See also Comment, Products Liability in
Pennsylvania, 13 VILL. L. REV. 793 (1968).
3. AUTOMOTIVE CRASH INJURY RESEARCH OF CORNELL AERONAUTICAL LABORATORY, INC.

(ACIRCAL),

AN EVALUATION OF DOOR LOCK EFFECTIVENESS: PRE-1956

V. POST-1955 AUTOMOBILES (1961); ACIRCAL, THE SAFETY PERFORMANCE OF
1962-63 AUTOMOBILE DOOR LATCHES AND COMPARISON WITH EARLIER LATCH DESIGNS
(1964); ACIRCAL, COMPARISON OF DOOR OPENING FREQUENCY IN 1967-1968 CARS
WITH EARLIER MODEL U.S. CARS

(1969).

4. Hearsay evidence has been defined as "testimony in court, or written evidence,
of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show
the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter." MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 246, at 584 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) (emphasis omitted).
5. 473 F.2d at 740.
6. The term "learned treatise" has been broadly defined to include "statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of
history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the
testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial
notice." Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates,
Rule 803(18). See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1690, at 2 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1973).
7. Legal writers, with the support of occasional decisions and rules, have
generally favored the admissibility of learned treatises, but the great weight of
authority has been that, absent statute or special circumstances, they are not admissible as evidence to prove the truth of the statements they contain, though usable in
the cross-examination of experts. See Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183,
316 (1972). See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 529 (1942) ; UNIFORM RULE OF
EVIDENCE 63(31); Comment, Learned Treatises and Rule 803(b)(18) of the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 VALPARAISO L. REV. 126, 130-33 (1970) ; 66 MICH. L.
REV. 183, 184 n.4 (1967); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1008 (1968).
8. The expert witness is permitted by a few courts to refer to "the writers of
his profession, either specifically by quotation, or generally by referring to professional
opinion as corroborating his views." 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1700(a), at 17.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/6
9. See Bogacki v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 417 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1969).
10. Id.
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In the instant case, the court looked initially to rule 43(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which establishes the criteria for the
admissibility of evidence in federal courts." The rule allows for the
introduction of evidence which is admissible under federal statutes, under
rules of evidence applied by the courts of the state, or under rules of
evidence employed in suits in equity in federal court prior to the adoption
of the rule. 12 The court summarily disposed of the plaintiff's contention
that the disputed evidence in the instant case was admissible under the
13
first two criteria.
In an attempt to meet the third alternative for admitting the analyses, plaintiff urged that the rules of evidence applicable in suits in equity
had permitted the introduction, during the direct examination of an
expert witness, of statements contained in learned treatises upon which
the expert had relied in the formation of his opinion. 14 In addressing
this argument, the court considered and analyzed prior federal decisions,
especially Western Assurance Co. v. J.H. Mohlman Co.,' 5 which, while

distinguishable on their facts from the instant case, clearly recognized a
partial learned treatise exception. The cases relied upon were decided at
law, and to that extent, presented an apparent anomaly when considered
in light of the wording of rule 43(a). 16 However, having found support
for the learned treatise exception in the cases at law, the court noted
11. Rule 43 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part*

All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the
United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts
of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of
evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the
United States court is held.
FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (emphasis added).
12. Id.
13. Plaintiff initially contended that the analyses in issue, though hearsay, were
admissible under a federal statute as business records of Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc., 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970), provides in part that any writing or record shall
be admissible as evidence if made in the regular course of any business, and if it was
the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record. This argument was not pursued by the court. 473 F.2d at 743.
It was also urged that Pennsylvania law recognized a learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule.
See Grantham v. Goetz, 401 Pa. 349, 164 A.2d 225 (1960).
The language of rule 4 3(a) speaks in terms of admissibility, the test being satisfied
when any one source permits admission. Having determined that federal precedents
supported admission, it was unnecessary to explore the scope of the hearsay exception
in Pennsylvania. 473 F.2d at 745. See Green, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a),
5 VAND. L. REv. 560, 569 (1952).
14. 473 F.2d at 743.
15. 83 F. 811 (2d Cir. 1897). Western Assurance held that, where the scientific
work containing the proffered material is concededly recognized as a standard authority
by the profession, statistics of mechanical experiments and tabulations of the results
thereof may be read in evidence by an expert witness in support of his professional
opinion, when such statistics and tabulations are generally relied upon by experts in
the particular field. The Second Circuit, in deciding Western Assurance, relied on
Vicksburg & Meridian R.R. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545 (1886), which had recognized
the validity of standard mortality and annuity tables as acceptable evidence. 83 F.2d
at 820.
Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
16. See note 11 supra.
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that Western Assurance had been cited approvingly in a suit in equity.1 7
On the basis of this analysis, the court was able to conclude that the
evidence was admissible under rule 43(a).18
The Bair court adopted this line of reasoning in order to comply
with the technical requirements of rule 43(a). Although no official explanation for the language used in the rule has ever been given,' 9 it is
apparent that the rule was designed to advance the liberal trend envisioned
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by broadening the bases of
admissibility.20 Since federal equity practice had been free from a formal
body of evidentiary standards, it was predicted that the federal courts
would not be unduly restricted from instituting their own evidentiary
rules.21 However, instead of responding with flexibility and innovation,
the courts unnecessarily relied upon precedent and either implicitly or
expressly followed evidentiary rulings at law in the absence of specific
equity authority.2 2 - Whether or not such an approach comports with the
spirit of rule 43, it is clear that the court adopted it in Bair. In the
absence of equity precedent, the court reasoned that an equity chancellor
would have ascribed to the law courts' evidentiary holdings.2 3
In deciding that independent statistical analyses are admissible as
evidence to support an expert's opinion, the court was clearly impressed
17. G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publishing Co., 207 F. 515 (2d Cir. 1913),

appeal dismissed, 237 U.S. 618 (1915).

1& 473 F.2d- at 744.

19. Green, supra note 13, at 561.
20. Note, The Admissibility of Evidence Under Federal Rule 43(a), 48 VA. L.
REv. 939, 942 (1962).
21. Callahan & Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 YALE L.J. 194, 197 (1937).
It should be noted in this context that the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
requires that, except in situations governed by the federal constitution or acts of Congress, state law governs matters tried in federal court. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).

The

application of this doctrine is called into question by the operation of rule 43(a) in
the context of a diversity case in which the applicable state law bars admission of
evidence which is otherwise properly admissible as having satisfied the first or second
test of rule 43(a). See note 11 supra. To the extent that rules of evidence are
ordinarily thought to be procedural rather than substantive, the Erie doctrine is of
slight import. See, e.g., Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1882); Jefferson
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lifetime Say. & Loan Ass'n, 396 F.2d 21, 23-24 (9th Cir. 1968).
However, there are "circumstances in which a question of admissibility of evidence is
so intertwined with a state substantive rule that the state rule excluding the evidence

will be followed in order to give full effect to the state's substantive policy." 9 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2405, at 326-27 (1971).
See generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304

U.S. 64 (1938).
22. One of the reasons given for this result has been:

The law of evidence for courts of equity is in general the same as for courts of
law. So far as the rules of admissibility are concerned, the main difference was
in the less strict application in equity. Hence it is not surprising that the courts
used decisions in actions at law to determine the rules of evidence heretofore
applied in equity.
Green, supra note 13, at 561. Wigmore believed the rule required the application of
equity precedent exclusively, and since the available precedent was minimal, it would
receive little use. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 6c, at 197. See, e.g., Monarch Ins.
,Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 411 (5th Cir. 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/6
23. 473 F.2d at 744. See United States v. 60.14 Acres of Land, 362 F.2d 660, 666
,(3d Cir. 1966).
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by the argument of necessity. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are directed towards achieving a just resolution of civil cases on the
merits. 24 Implicit in such an approach would be a policy favoring the

admission of all relevant evidence. However, when evaluating the merits
of such a liberal admission policy, due regard must be given to the
quality of the evidence admitted as well as to the quantity. By limiting
the introduction of treatises to situations in which an expert is present
on the stand and available to explain and interpret the information, Bair
allows a significant increment of reliable evidence without an appreciable
sacrifice in testimonial quality.
Because of increasing technical sophistication and experimentation,
it is rare for one individual to collect and evaluate all of the scientific
data which comprise a technical report or treatise. It is thus possible
that a strict application of the hearsay rule would result in the exclusion
of the most relevant and technically appropriate evidence.2 5 When confronted with such an alternative, it is submitted that the balance should
be struck in favor of admissibility since this would lead more readily to
a just resolution on the merits. Were a court to adopt the alternative
position and exclude the analyses, the adjudicatory process would be
deprived of a full exposition of the factors which ultimately determine
liability. In addition, much can be said on a pragmatic level for a position that makes use of the best substitute available for the personal testimony of an author-experimenter, especially where the data offered into
evidence has been acknowledged as accurate, relied upon by the appropriate profession, and, in many instances, has contributed to the very
opinion to which any qualified expert may orally testify.
In addition to necessity, a compelling criterion which normally must
be satisfied before hearsay will be admitted is trustworthiness. 26 In Bair,
a number of elements combined to persuade the court that the analyses
embodied the requisite validity, 27 especially the fact that departments of

government, industry, and the engineering profession relied upon them. 28
24. Weinstein, Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules, 44 F.R.D. 375,
381 (1967).
25. Situations can be readily hypothesized where a scientific investigation is so
involved, segmented, and departmentalized that there is no one person who could
testify to the conclusion derived without admitting that his opinion was to a greater
or lesser extent based upon information supplied to him by some co-worker. The
alternatives for the court would be to admit the report or to require the entire.
research team to testify.
26. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1692, at 6. Circumstances attending the publication of a learned treatise which give it a fair probability of trustworthiness include:
(1) The declarant has no motive to misrepresent. While he may have a bias in favor
of a theory, it is a bias in favor of the truth as he sees it; (2) The author, writing
primarily for his profession, knows, at the cost of his reputation, that his conclusions
will be subject to scrutiny and possible refutation; (3) The probability of accuracy
is at least greater than that which accompanies the testimony of a paid expert who
takes the stand. Id.
27. 473 F.2d at 742, 743. Facts legitimatizing the analyses were that no objection
to their authenticity was made, the regular method of compilation was set forth on
Published
by
Charles sponsors
Widger School
of Law Digital
Repository, 1973
their Villanova
face, andUniversity
the research
consisted
of well-known organizations. Id.
28. Id. at 744.
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However, in expanding the exception recognized by Western Assurance
and allowing, not the admission of statistics of author-conducted controlled experiments, 29 but the analysis after the event of a number of
actual injury-producing accidents,30 the court implicitly recognized the
possibility, if not the probability, that a statistical compilation of data
not subject to the controlled atmosphere of a laboratory would be inherently less reliable. Consequently, in evaluating the result reached, the
issue of the opponent's right to cross-examination becomes relevant and
must be considered.
Lack of an opportunity for cross-examination is one of the major
objections to a learned treatise exception."' Cross-examination functions
as a means to test both the credibility of the expert and the validity of
his opinion. Bair arguably does minimal violence to the policy requiring
an opportunity to cross-examine since it permits an exception only in
the situation where an expert on the stand refers to a report either as
corroboration for, or as a basis of, his opinion. The opposing party,
even in the event he chooses not to submit a rebuttal treatise or a contradicting expert, has the opportunity to develop flaws in the treatise by
82
cross-examining the witness on the stand.
The rule enunciated in Bair will become applicable in all federal
courts if the proposed federal rules of evidence become effective, a8 a point
expressly recognized by the Bair court. Proposed rule 803(18) provides
for a learned treatise exception of the same dimensions as that found
29. While the Second Circuit in Western Assurance was impressed by the argu-

ment that the report under scrutiny was recognized as a standard authority by the
profession, the facts of that case were such that the hearsay rule was expanded only
to the extent that it permitted a witness present in court to read from a report
statistics interpreting controlled experiments conducted by the author. 83 F. at 821.
30. 473 F.2d at 742.
31. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 1690(1), at 2. Other objections to the admission of a learned treatise besides inability to cross-examine include the absence of an
author's oath, and the fact that the subject matter is mutable. That an author's thesis
may not be fairly and accurately presented, and that authors' opinions may differ
radically provide additional reasons for disallowing treatises. Another concern is the
problem that jurors may not be able to understand the technical language of scientific
treatises. Id. Comment, Use and Introduction of Exact Science Books and Learned
Treatises, 38 Miss. L.J. 296, 304 (1967).
32. 473 F.2d at 745. The more liberal approach adopted by Alabama of admitting
treatises during direct examination as substantive evidence of the matter contained
therein has not drastically altered the trial practices in that state. It has, however,
minimized the need for extensive cross-examination due to the potential use of the
treatise as a ready method of impeaching the declarant. Comment, Learned Treatises
as Direct Evidence: The Alabama Experience, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1169.
33. 473 F.2d at 744-45.
Congress prevented the rules of evidence from taking effect absent its
express approval. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, 87 Stat. 9 (1973). Subsequently, the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice presented an extensively revised draft of the rules
for comment by the bar and judiciary. The proposed House modifications do not
affect the proposed learned treatise exception. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Proposed Amendments by the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House Committee

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/6
on the Judiciary (Committee Print, June

28, 1973).
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in the court's opinion.8' At present, Bair provides a well-reasoned precedent for those courts confronted with a similar situation.
F.P.N.

GUILTY PLEA NOT INVOLRULE 11 UNTARY IF BASED UPON AN ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL TO WHICH THE PROSECUTION DID NOT CONTRIBUTE.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Paradisov. United States (3d Cir, 1973)
Defendants were indicted by federal grand juries sitting in New Jersey
and New York.' They consented to the transfer of the New York indictment to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 2
and pleaded guilty to one count of each indictment.3 At their sentencing
hearing immediately after one defendant was sentenced to two consecutive
5-year terms of imprisonment, 4 both requested that their guilty pleas be
withdrawn, claiming that they had believed that any sentences would be
concurrent.5 The sentence imposed was vacated and sentencing was deferred until a hearing on their requests." At that hearing it was established
that the defendants' misconception as to sentencing was not due to any
bargain or agreement with the prosecution, but rather to an erroneous
34. 473 F.2d at 744.
The proposed rule reads:
Learned treatises. - To the extent called to the attention of an expert
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination,
statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject
of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority
by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by
judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may
not be received as exhibits.
Proposed Rule of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, Rule 803(18).
1. The indictment issued by the New Jersey grand jury charged conspiracy to
possess stolen goods and possession of goods stolen from interstate commerce.
The New York indictment charged the defendants Paradiso and Bonnacci with
possession of different goods stolen from interstate commerce. Paradiso v. United
States, 482 F.2d 409, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1973).
Z Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant
arrested on a warrant issued in a district other than the district of arrest may
state in writing that he wishes to plead guilty or nolo contendere, to waive trial in
the district in which the warrant was issued, and to consent to disposition of the
case in the district where he was arrested, subject to approval by the United States
attorneys in both districts. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20.
3. The defendants pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count of the New Jersey
indictment. 482 F.2d at 411.
4. Id. Defendant Paradiso was not sentenced at this time. Immediately after
Bonnacci was sentenced, and prior to the imposition of sentence on Paradiso,
requested
to School
withdraw
their
guilty
pleas. 1973
Id.
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assumption made by their own counsel. 7 Both defendants' requests were
denied and both were sentenced to two consecutive 5-year terms., Subsequently, they filed motions challenging the sentences and seeking, alternatively, to have their guilty pleas withdrawn.) The district court denied,
the motions and the Third Circuit affirmed, holding: (1) that the defendants
had not been denied due process; (2) that the requirements of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 as to voluntariness and understanding of
the charge and consequences of the plea had been met; 10 and (3) that
there had been no "manifest injustice" which would justify a post-sentencing
withdrawal of a guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32(d). 11 Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1973).
Plea bargaining, negotiation with the prosecution in which a guilty
plea may be offered in exchange for a recommendation of a lenient sentence
or the dismissal of certain charges, 12 was expressly approved by the Supreme
Court in Santobello v. New York. 1 3 The Santobello Court described plea
7. Id. at 411-12. In a conversation between defendants' counsel
an assistantUnited States attorney in Brooklyn, New York, defendants' counseland
was imormed_
that if

the New Jersey charges were transferred to New York, the
policy in.
the Brooklyn office would be to recommend 5-year sentences to runusual
concurrently.
Defendants' counsel then talked to an assistant United States attorney in
Jersey who stated that he and the assistant United States attorney in Brooklyn New
had
agreed to have the New York case transferred to New Jersey. Defendants'
counsel
stated at the hearing that he was under the impression that due to the conversationbetween the two assistant United States attorneys, the policy of the Brooklyn
would prevail in the disposition of the case in the New Jersey district oltice
Therefore, when the defendants asked their counsel what sentence he thoughtcourt.
they
would receive, he stated that "there was a good probability of getting a concurrent
sentence." Id. at 412.
8. Id. at 411.
9. Id.
10. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states in part:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of tne court,.
nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not
accept such a plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing
the
defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea ....
The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied
that there is a factual basis for the plea.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
11. Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made only
before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct
manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment
of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
The defendants' "manifest injustice" argument was rejected by the Paradiso.
court. The court noted that the post-sentencing standard for judging motions
for
withdrawal of guilty pleas is more rigorous than that applied before sentencing,.
and that the purpose of this stricter standard is to avoid motions which are
based
solely on disappointment with the sentence imposed. 482 F.2d at 416.
12. See generally Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors
to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964).
13. 404 U.S. 257 (1972). In Santobello, the Supreme Court held that due process.
requires the prosecution to perform the promised course of action for which
the
defendant's guilty plea was made. Id. at 262. The Santobello Court did not
specify
what relief would be warranted by refusal of the prosecution to abide by its agreement;
rather, the case was remanded to the state court for appropriate relief. Id. at
262-63.
The Court, however, did cite two available options: (1) permission to withdraw
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/6
theguilty plea; or (2) performance of the prosecutorial agreement at the defendant's.
request. Id. at 263.
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4
:bargaining as an "essential component of the administration of justice","
5
The
:and noted that "[plroperly administered, it is to be encouraged."'
,Court qualified that approval by stating that, "[tjhe guilty plea must . . .
be voluntary and knowing and if it was induced by promises, the essence

,of the promises must . . . be made known."'u

One problem not resolved by Santobello is posed by the situation in
which advice of counsel does in fact influence the defendant's guilty plea,
*butin which no promise, agreement, or inducement is made by the prose,.cution. The Paradisocourt, following Masciola v. United States,7 rejected
'the argument that in such a situation a defendant has been denied due
-,process.18 The Masciola court had held that inaccurate assurances by
counsel, or erroneous expectations by the defendant, did not constitute, by
Athemselves, grounds for reversal of conviction or the withdrawal of a guilty
-plea.19 The defendant in Masciola had filed affidavits alleging that he had
'been assured by counsel that any sentence would run concurrently with the
-sentence he was already serving. He did not allege any understanding with
-the prosecution, with the court, or any other government contribution to
the assurances allegedly received. The district court dismissed the petition
-without an evidentiary hearing and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Masciola court considered Santobello to be applicable only where some promise
-or understanding existed to which the prosecution was a party. 20 Thus,
'in neither case had a defendant been denied due process since assurance by
,counsel that concurrent sentences would be imposed was not of itself
-sufficient to render the guilty plea "involuntary."
Before a guilty plea may be accepted, the trial judge is required, by
,rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to inquire into its
-voluntariness.2 1 In Brady v. United States,22 the Supreme Court cited
and approved of the voluntariness standard set forth by the Fifth Circuit
:in Sheldn v. United States :25

'[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him
by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced
by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or
14. Id. at 260.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 261-62.
17. 469 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972).
18. 482 F.2d at 412.
19. 469 F.2d at 1057. The major factual difference between the instant case
-and Masciola was that the defendants' attorney in Paradiso based his erroneous
-assumption on some general remarks made to him by an assistant United States
:attorney in New York. See note 7 supra. The Paradiso court apparently viewed
this as a difference without a distinction, as in neither case did the defendants rely
-upon an actual agreement with Government counsel. 482 F.2d at 412.
20. 469 F.2d at 1059.
21. See note 10 supra.
397 U.S.
742 (1970).
Published by22.
Villanova
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Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
23. 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26
((1958).
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perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no
proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).' 24
The Paradiso court reviewed the trial judge's rule 11 inquiry and found
it to be sufficient under previously established standards. 25 The trial judge
had read the substance of the indictments to which the defendants had
pleaded guilty.2 6 The court noted that in Woodward v. United States,2 7'
the Third Circuit had stated:
To satisfy itself that the defendant actually does comprehend the
charges the court must explain the meaning of the charge and what
basic acts must be proved to establish guilt. 8
The court considered that, in certain situations such as that under consideration, that requirement could be met through a reading of the indictment. 29 The court also noted that rule 11 did not necessarily require an
explicit statement that sentences could be imposed consecutively, since such
a fact was implicit in an explanation of separate sentences for each crime . 0
The Paradiso court, in rejecting the defendants' claims, clearly indicated a desire to keep the number of future appeals of this type to a
minimum.3 1 The court urged the district courts in the Third Circuit to
adopt "prophylactic" measures in order to avoid a continuous and growing
number of "ostensible" claims alleging unfulfilled plea bargains, involuntary
pleas, and/or unexpected sentences.32
The court suggested that the district courts complement the rule 11
inquiry3 3 by explaining to the defendant that plea bargaining is an approved
procedure in the federal courts 34 and that, therefore, notice given to the
court of the existence of a plea bargain will not prejudice the defendants. 5
The court also suggested that the district courts question defense counsel
and the prosecution regarding the existence of any negotiations. 6 The
court recommended that if bargaining did exist, both the defense counsel
and the prosecution be required to state the terms of the promise or
agreement for the record and that the defendant be required to signify his
24. 397 U.S. at 755, quoting 246 F.2d at 572 n.2.
25. 482 F.2d at 413. See United States v. Davis, 470 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1972).
26. 482 F.2d at 413.
27. 426 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1970).
28. Id. at 962. See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 n.7 (1969).
29. 482 F.2d at 414. Other circuits have indicated that the reading of the
indictment in and of itself is not enough to satisfy the requirements of rule 11.
See Majko v. United States, 457 F,2d 790, 791 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Cody, 438 F.2d 287, 288 (8th Cir. 1971) ; United States v. Steele, 413 F.2d 967, 969
(2d Cir.), overruled on other grounds, 432 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1970).

30. 482 F.2d at 415.
31. Id. at 413.
32. Id.
33. The procedures suggested by the court do not constitute part of the rule 11
inquiry; rather, they are solely suggestions to be utilized in addition to the rule 11
procedure. Id. at 413-16.
34. See notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/6
35. 482 F.2d at 413.
36. Id.
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understanding of the terms.37 The trial judge could then direct his inquiry
and explanation to the consequences of the agreement. He could also
then inform the defendant that the recommendations made by the prosecution are not necessarily binding upon the court. These suggested procedures, which should enable the trial judge to ascertain the existence of a
plea bargain, as well as determine whether the bargain is fundamentally
fair or has been accepted as a result of unwarranted pressure,3 8 appear to
provide a sound method for avoiding post-sentence claims motivated by
the defendant's disappointment in the sentence received.a 9
While the Paradiso court did not suggest that the district courts'
inquiry extend to defense counsels' recommendations, it is possible that a
district court will regard such inquiry as proper in light of the Third
Circuit's charge to "take affirmative action to curb recurring situations
which give rise to defendants' misapprehensions, although created by advice
of their own counsel or otherwise ....-40 It is submitted, however, that
a thorough and detailed inquiry by the trial judge should be expressly
limited to ascertaining only the presence of prosecutorial arrangements
since a further inquiry could result in an intrusion upon the attorney-client
relationship. A situation may be hypothesized in which a defendant may
admit that, although there had been no inducements or agreements by the
prosecutor, defense counsel had advised him that a guilty plea would be
beneficial. Should the trial judge then question the defendant or his attorney
as to the basis for such an opinion, the defendant might state that counsel's
advice was based on the belief that leniency would be granted if a guilty
plea were entered. To avoid the potential for prejudice which might be
engendered by such a response, it would seem advisable that district courts
adopting the Third Circuit's suggestions for an expanded rule 11 inquiry
limit their inquiry to prosecutorial arrangements and inform the defendant
and defendant's counsel accordingly.
The Paradisocourt further noted that, although a rigid rule requiring a
judge to explain that sentences could be imposed consecutively was not
mandated, such a practice would be advisable to avoid misunderstanding. 4
It would appear that a practice of explaining the possibility of consecutive
sentences, requiring a minimal amount of court time, would be another
effective method of cutting down on post-sentence claims. It would avoid
problems such as those in the instant case which arise when representations
by counsel concerning sentencing are construed by the defendant as binding
upon the court.
The Paradiso court suggested, rather than directed, that the district
courts adopt the procedures it discussed. 42 The time and difficulty involved
37. Id.
38. See generally
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39. See text accompanying note 32 supra.

40. 482 F.2d at 412.
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